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Vorwort  
 
Mehr als neunzig Prozent aller bewaffneten Konflikte der Gegenwart finden 
innerhalb staatlicher Grenzen statt, sehen neben dem Militär zumeist 
schwacher Staaten allzu häufig irreguläre bewaffnete Formationen und 
marodierende Söldner als Beteiligte. Die unmittelbaren Folgen des Kon-
fliktaustrags und die Hinterlassenschaften der Gewalt treffen vor allem die 
Zivilbevölkerung. Flucht und Vertreibung, Armut, Anarchie, Kriminalität, 
soziale Missstände, Hunger, Epidemien, Hoffnungslosigkeit markieren le-
diglich Schlagworte, hinter denen sich unendliches Leid und Perspektivlo-
sigkeit der Menschen verbirgt. Die internationale Gemeinschaft ist vor die-
sem Hintergrund mehr denn je gefordert, aktiv zur Linderung der 
unmittelbaren Not, zum Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung vor Übergriffen, zur 
Bildung und Stärkung partizipatorisch verfasster Staaten und zur Förderung 
sozialer und ökonomischer Perspektiven beizutragen. Konfliktbeilegung 
und Friedenskonsolidierung greifen ineinander, müssen zeitgleich und 
abgestimmt aufeinander in Angriff genommen werden. Zivile und 
militärische Instrumente sind in diesem Zusammenhang Teile eines 
friedenspolitischen Gesamtkonzepts, wobei das Erfordernis der Balance 
beider durch die verschiedenen beteiligten Akteure unterschiedlich 
wahrgenommen wird. Das CIMIC-Konzept ist Gegenstand der folgenden 
kritischen Analyse. Der Autor, Peter Rehse, war im Studienjahr 2002/2003 
Student des vom Kooperationsverbund Friedensforschung und 
Sicherheitspolitik durchgeführten Postgraduiertenstudienganges „Master of 
Peace and Security Studies – M.P.S.“ der Universität Hamburg in 
Kooperation mit dem Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik 
an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH). Beim nachfolgenden Text handelt es 
sich um eine bearbeitete Fassung der Masterarbeit, die am Institut für 
Friedenssicherungsrecht und Humanitäres Völkerrecht an der Ruhr-
Universität Bochum, Kooperationspartner im Studiengang M.P.S., betreut 
wurde. 
 
Hans J. Gießmann 
Vorsitzender des Gemeinsamen Ausschusses M.P.S. der Universität 
Hamburg und des IFSH 
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I. Introduction 
 
Since the early 1990s, the international community has intervened in 
internal conflicts to an increasing degree. The new reality in interventional 
global policy has resulted in increased contact between international armed 
forces and humanitarian actors. Among other places, the missions in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor showed the need for these actors to work 
more closely together than had happened in the past. This has been 
described as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and it has consequently 
become a key policy and operational issue for all involved actors. While 
recognising the need to find ways of cooperation and coordination, the 
different actors hold various views on how to respond to the altered 
conditions. 
 
The present paper contributes to the debate on civil-military cooperation in 
complex emergencies by offering a detailed analysis of the CIMIC policy 
of, on the one hand, NATO, as a military actor, and on the other hand, the 
ICRC, as a humanitarian actor. Previous to this analysis, in Chapter 2, the 
paper clarifies the meaning of CIMIC and gives essential background 
information on the key concepts of humanitarian principles and types of 
international military interventions. The paper focuses on the military-
humanitarian relationship in the case of peace support operations. 
 
NATO has been chosen as it has recently entered the arena of peace support 
operations, and since it represents the world’s largest military alliance with 
its member states forces being among the most actively involved armed 
forces in international peacekeeping. To provide a comparison, the ICRC is 
a highly respected actor in the humanitarian field. It was also the first 
international humanitarian organisation and fulfils a role as a guardian of 
International Humanitarian Law. 
 
The analysis of NATO’s CIMIC approach in Chapter 3, is primarily based 
on the Military Council doctrine 411/1 (MC 411/1) and the Allied Joint 
Publication 9 (AJP-9). The MC 411/1 came into force in 2001 and its 
intention is the launch of a NATO military policy on CIMIC. The AJP-9 
provides the actual guiding principles and procedures for the 
implementation and execution of CIMIC. In 2002, the AJP-9 was approved 
by the NATO member states. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the analysis of the ICRC’s position in relation to which 
the 2001 Studer paper is the key document. Additionally, this paper focuses 
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on the 1995 “Report on the Use of Armed Protection for Humanitarian 
Assistance”, which was issued by the Council of Delegates of the Red 
Cross, and the ICRC’s position paper on humanitarian intervention, as well 
as the position paper on humanitarian-military relations of the Steering 
Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the 1994 UN-OCHA 
“Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets”. The last two 
documents are relevant for an examination of the ICRC’s position, since the 
organisation is, besides other Non-Governmental Organisations, a member 
of the SCHR, and the ICRC was also part of the Review Committee which 
formulated the UN-OCHA guidelines. Chapter 5 presents the final 
conclusions. 
 
The aim of this work is to clarify the term CIMIC and to explore and 
compare the different positions and underlying perceptions of NATO and 
the ICRC and to contribute to further discussion in this area by providing 
some outline recommendations pertaining to both actors. 
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II. Concepts and Definitions 
 
Before discussing the CIMIC approaches of NATO and the ICRC in 
complex emergencies, it is necessary to give an overview of the relevant 
aspects and key issues of the current debate on Civil-Military Cooperation. 
Furthermore it is necessary to outline the meaning of some key concepts 
and the definitions used in the debate and to introduce the concept of Peace 
Support Operations. 
 
II. 1 The Current Debate on Civil-Military Cooperation 
 
At the conclusion of the bipolar world order in the late 1980s the 
geopolitical situation underwent significant changes. There are several 
factors, which define the present situation. This paper will briefly identify 
the relevant aspects that caused the changes and clarify the key issues of the 
current debate on Civil-Military Cooperation. 
 
Since the end of the cold war era the number of conflicts increased and their 
nature changed. Until the late 1980s the Third World belligerents were 
dependent on weapon supply and monetary support from the superpowers. 
Through this dependency the First World held the incentives to influence 
the conflicts. Until the late 1980s, the majority of wars were inter-state 
conflicts, but nowadays the world faces predominantly intra-state disputes 
and civil wars. By the end of the cold war, the absence of external support 
led to what is called “war economies”. The warring parties had to find new 
sources to finance their disputes.1 Typically this is the extraction of wealth 
to sustain military activities. Trade in oil, diamonds, timber, narcotics, or 
even violent asset stripping and massive manipulation of markets can fuel 
these economies.2 Consequently weak states have become more vulnerable 
to internal disputes. In several cases in Africa, states even disintegrated to 
such an extent that the governmental structures completely dissolved. 
Another characteristic of the new wars is that the civil population is no 
longer only affected by the war; but has become a primary target on account 
of their group identity. The promotion of ethnic clashes, which had been 
suppressed by the superpowers during the block-confrontation, lead to in 
many cases to immense atrocities. 
                                                          
1  Cf.: Münkler, Herfried (2000): Die neuen Kriege, Rowohlt Verlag, Reinbek bei 
Hamburg, p. 159 et seq. 
2  Cf.: Macrae, Joanna/Leader, Nicholas (2000): Shifting Sands: The search for coherence 
between political and humanitarian responses to complex emergencies, HPG Report 8, 
Overseas Development Institute, London, p. 14. 
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During the 1990s a wider definition of security emerged. The overcoming 
of the East-West division lead to a surge of optimism to fight threats to 
international peace through strengthened international cooperation. 
Additionally to the ‘traditional’ military threats like inter-state conflicts, the 
UN and individual governments showed increasing concern about threats to 
stability resulting from internal conflicts, like poverty, massive human 
rights abuses, ethnic clashes and inequality.3 Also transnational threats, such 
as crime, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were 
addressed.4 The new perception of security caused a shift in international 
and UN policy. The rights and dignity of individuals were increasingly 
valued higher than the sovereignty of the state. The international 
community showed a greater willingness to intervene and was also prepared 
to go beyond diplomacy and sanctions.5 Humanitarian concerns had entered 
the agenda of the Security Council. The use of military force to push 
through respect for human rights law and International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) became legitimate. Since the Cold War three types of violation of 
IHL had been used to legitimise the use of force: Harm to civilians, 
problems in the delivery of aid and violence against humanitarian workers.6 
 
To meet the new security threats the UN developed a different way to 
respond. From 1991 the face of UN peacekeeping missions changed 
substantially.7 Until then UN Peacekeepers were used for dealing with inter-
state conflicts, serving as neutral observers to monitor ceasefires and to 
create buffer zones. The use of force was prohibited. Starting in the early 
1990s peacekeeping forces were increasingly applied to intra-state conflicts 
and civil wars. The tasks, which were carried out by the peacekeepers, 
became more comprehensive and complex. The UN started to mandate 
missions under Chapter VII of the UN-Charter, which allowed the deployed 
forces to take coercive action. Although the military is still the core part of 
                                                          
3  In 1992 the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated in the Agenda for Peace that is 
no longer possible to separate humanitarian issues from the wider problem of peace and 
security, Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992): An Agenda for Peace – Report of the Secretary 
General, UN Doc. A/47/227-S/24111, New York. 
4  Cf.: Macrae, Joanna (2002): The new humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global 
Humanitarian Action, HPG Report 11, Overseas Development Institute, London, p.30 et 
seq. 
5  Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, altogether 55 United Nations 
peacekeeping operations have been conducted. 42 of those operations started later then 
1987. 
6  Cf.: Roberts, Adam (2000): Humanitarian Issues and Agencies as Triggers for 
International Military Action, In: International Review of the Red Cross, No. 839, p. 
676. 
7  Starting point was the humanitarian intervention in Northern Iraq and later the UN peace 
enforcement in Somalia (UNOSOM II). 
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the peacekeeping forces, the number of civilians working next to the 
military increased. This happened both, because of the more comprehensive 
peace operations or so-called multidimensional peace operations, which 
embraced the military aspects as well as a broadening range of humanitarian 
aspects, and also the number of agencies delivering assistance increased 
substantially. This is true for the UN agencies as well as for the Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Another result is that the military 
came into a far closer relationship with the civilian aspects of a mission. 
Consequently the points of contact increased and the relationship between 
military and civilian actors became more important. After a number of 
peacekeeping failures in the mid-1990s, particularly in Somalia, Rwanda 
and Bosnia with the tragedy of Srebrenica, the attitude of the UN member 
states changed. They showed certain reluctance and a diminishing will to 
address the root causes of the conflicts. Instead, the tendency of using a 
mixture of humanitarian and political mandates as a substitute for political 
and military action to end a conflict became apparent. At the same time, the 
range of action of the extremely heterogeneous group of NGOs expanded. 
Their activities cover now the whole spectrum of PSOs. The enhancement 
of the traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peace operations caused 
a blurring of the traditional division of roles between the military and the 
humanitarian community. 
 
This triggered a debate about civil-military relations where the term Civil-
Military Cooperation (CIMIC) became one of the key expressions. In the 
discussion the different actors used CIMIC in various contexts with 
differing implications. In particular the NGO community used and is using 
CIMIC as a term to refer to military involvement in humanitarian aid. The 
core of the discussion refers to the changed use and role of the military. In 
the so-called complex emergencies the military had been assigned with a 
broader spectrum of jobs, which are sometimes not of a strictly military 
nature. The NATO response to the Kosovo crisis, where the armed forces 
performed a dual role, especially caused an intensive debate about the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. During the Kosovo crisis, NATO 
flew air strikes in Yugoslavia and simultaneously committed massive 
resources to aid refugees arriving in Macedonia and Albania. 
 
This raised the concerns of the humanitarian community. Military 
interference, in what has been seen as ‘humanitarian space’ has been widely 
rejected. Humanitarianism as a focal point of military intervention raised 
suspicion among the NGOs. It is widely been seen as a way to legitimise 
intervention by pursuing different objectives or concealing political failure. 
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It is believed that a merger of political, military and humanitarian objectives 
compromises humanitarian objectives and principles. The potential threats 
to which the NGO community repeatedly refers are that the military can 
never be perceived as neutral and impartial, since it is politically controlled. 
Any association of impartial humanitarian action with military objectives, 
regardless if it is only perceived or real, risks to turn humanitarian workers 
into a perceived enemy and poses a threat to their personal safety. A mixing 
of mandates may diminish the success of humanitarian relief or may even 
make impartial humanitarian work impossible. Moreover the suggestion 
that humanitarian action is subordinate to the military raised wide resistance 
among the humanitarian organisations.8 The humanitarian community 
insists that the delivery of aid has to be guided by the principles of 
impartiality, neutrality and independence. On the other hand the military 
discovered that its new role in PSOs required an effective management of 
the military-humanitarian interface. 
 
II.2 The Term CIMIC 
 
Since the early 1990s, Civil-Military Cooperation and its abbreviation 
CIMIC is the controversial term of a heated debate within the civilian, 
humanitarian and military community regarding their relationship with each 
other.  
 
Today’s military operations take place in complex environments. The 
military, multiple civilian and humanitarian institutions have to face a 
challenging and broader range of issues. In various cases the military has 
been confronted with tasks that are not precisely 'military' in nature. This 
has increased the importance of managing the civil-military interface, 
predominantly the one between the military and the humanitarian 
organisations. This process of management is frequently described as Civil-
Military Cooperation (CIMIC).  
 
Discussing CIMIC bears some difficulties. So far a universally accepted and 
coherent definition has not emerged within the community. Numerous 
actors refer to CIMIC in a variety of contexts, with differing meanings and 
                                                          
8  For more detailed description of this debate compare e.g.: Barry, Jane/Jefferys, Anna 
2002): A bridge too far: aid agencies and the military in humanitarian response, 
Overseas Development Institute, ODI Network HPN Paper 37, London; Abiew, Francis 
Kofi/Keating, Tom (1999): NGOs and UN Peacekeeping Operations: Strange 
Bedfellows, In: International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6, Nr. 2, p. 89-111; Curtis, Devon 
(2001): Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension, HPG Report 
10, Overseas Development Institute, London. 
 
 
15
 
in a multitude ways of interpretations. There is also a certain amount of 
confusion about the differences of Civil-Military Relations (CIMIR) and 
CIMIC. Usually CIMIR is taken to include a wider range of matters ranging 
from the issue of civilian-political control of the military to all forms of 
interaction between the military and the wider society. Some organisations, 
like NATO, view CIMIC as a part of CIMIR, whereas others do not make a 
noticeable distinction between them. The term CIMIC is used mainly in two 
different contexts: 
 
1. CIMIC, equated to CIMIR, as a collective term for all kinds of 
interaction and points of contacts of civilian organisations and the 
military. 
2. CIMIC as a military doctrine and as a part of CIMIR. 
 
In the beginning CIMIC functioned as a collective term. It predominantly 
related to all kinds of interaction and level of contact between civilian 
organisations and the military, which led each side to label its action as 
CIMIC. This created more confusion rather than actually helping the 
discussion. The increasing levels of interaction and rising significance of 
civil-military cooperation resulted in the development of different concepts 
by all kinds of actors under the label of CIMIC. This multiple use of 
CIMIC, the inconsistent perceptions of numerous actors regarding this term, 
caused confusion of ideas and misunderstandings. It also made valuable 
debate increasingly difficult to sustain. The situation is understandable. The 
starting points and the conditions are very different for every actor. The 
NGOs especially present a highly diversified and heterogeneous group, with 
diverse basic assumptions, objectives and working cultures. Taking this into 
account the question is, whether it is realistic to subsume the different 
aspects of the relationship between military and humanitarian actors as a 
whole under one encompassing term. This seems not to be feasible and 
concurrently also not desirable, since it could not accommodate all different 
perspectives. Attempts like this would result in the lowest common 
denominator, which could not reflect every aspect of the complex 
relationship. 
 
The problem of using CIMIC as a collective term has been recognised and 
the international community has started to take a more differentiated 
approach. The start of rethinking CIMIC can be seen as a result of the 
greater participation of NATO in PSOs. The Alliance’s involvement on the 
Balkans showed the increasing significance of a coherent NATO CIMIC 
policy. NATO developed procedures and military doctrines that made the 
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term CIMIC a well-defined and specific term in their military vocabulary. 
NATO successfully started to seize the expression and linked it with the 
Alliance’s understanding of Civil-Military Cooperation. This started to put 
pressure on the other organisations to develop new terms for their own 
Civil-Military Cooperation concepts in order to demarcate them from 
NATO. For example the United Nations Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) introduced the abbreviation UN 
CMCoorD for its programmes, which had earlier run under the label of 
CIMIC until autumn 2001. However, it has also to be noted that besides 
NATO a various number of other national militaries, in particular NATO 
member states, developed their own CIMIC doctrines. With a few 
exceptions, for example Switzerland, the national militaries mirror the 
NATO approach with variations in emphasis.9 A higher degree of consensus 
in the military community about the meaning of CIMIC would also be 
advantageous. 
 
Despite the ongoing differentiation, both meanings, CIMIC as a broad 
concept for every kind of interaction, as well as CIMIC as the NATO-
doctrine or more general the military doctrine, are still used. To avoid 
miscommunication a further differentiation is highly desirable. This has also 
been demanded by several civilian organisations.10 Until the collective use 
of CIMIC has been vanished, it crucial to explicitly state which meaning of 
CIMIC is being referred to. 
 
II.3 The Principles of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
“Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its 
primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected 
population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with 
the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and 
neutrality.”11  
 
                                                          
9  Cf.: Landon, James J./Hayes, Richard E.: National Approaches to Civil Military 
Coordination in Peace and Humanitarian Assistance Operations, [online] Department of 
Defence – Command and Control Research Programme, Washington D.C., no year, 
Available from: http://www.dodccrp.org/jjlfig1.htm, [Accessed 14th May 2003]. 
10  Among others the ICRC states that CIMIC is not an appropriate term to describe the task 
of delegate whose essential role is liasing with the military, Cf.: Studer, Meinrad (2001): 
The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict, In: IRRC, Volume 83, No. 842, 
p. 378. 
11  The definition was taken from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UN-OCHA). 
 
 
17
 
In its original conception humanitarian assistance’s objective is not to settle 
conflicts, but to simply alleviate human suffering.  
 
II.3.1 International Humanitarian Law 
 
The Humanitarian Principles are derived from the International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL). IHL can be divided in two components, the 
‘Hague’ and the ‘Geneva Law’. The ‘Hague Law’ has been codified in a 
series of declarations and treaties following the first Hague Peace 
Conference in 1899. It is concerned with the conduct of hostilities. The 
principle of distinction between civilians and military targets is found in the 
‘Hague Law’. 
 
The ‘Geneva Law’ consists of the four Geneva Conventions from 1949 and 
the Additional Protocols from 1977. The four Geneva Conventions concern 
the treatment of victims of war. The first two Conventions deal with the 
wounded and sick of armed forces on land (Convention I) and at sea 
(Convention II). Convention III relates to the conduct of combatants and to 
the protection of prisoners of war, while Convention IV concerns protection 
of civilian persons and population in times of war. Article 3 is common to 
all four Conventions. It sets a minimum standard, regarding the treatment of 
persons taking no active part in the hostilities, for conflicts of a non-
international character, occurring in the territory of the contracting parties.12 
                                                          
12  Article 3: In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound 
to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without 
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex birth or wealth, or 
any other similar criteria. To this end, the acts are and shall remain prohibited at any 
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should 
further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the 
other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions 
shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. 
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The two additional protocols to the Geneva Convention combine aspects of 
the ‘Hague Law’ and the ‘Geneva Law’. 
 
The Convention IV, the Additional Protocols and the common Article 3 are 
authoritative for the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, only 22 
of a total of 289 articles relate to the provision of relief. 13 Whereas common 
Article 3 provides the most minimal standard by stating that in the case of a 
non-international conflict “an impartial body, such as the ICRC may offer 
its services to the Parties to the conflict.” The basic provision for 
humanitarian relief is quoted in Article 10 of Convention IV: 
 
“The provision of the present Convention constitutes no obstacle to the 
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross 
or any other impartial humanitarian organisation may, subject to the 
consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection 
of civilian persons and for their relief.” 
 
The Geneva Conventions, as an international treaty, address only states and 
not humanitarian agencies. In general, the Conventions are only binding on 
those states that ratified the contracts, unless it is customary law, which is 
binding on every state, whether the state signed it or not. Articles that refer 
to the provision of aid are phrased in the way that they set obligations on the 
parties to allow relief or they describe conditions, in which the parties are 
entitled to impose relief delivery. All articles concerned with aid delivery 
refer to international conflicts. The only exception is the common Article 3, 
which is universally accepted and has become customary law.14 
 
Although the Conventions do not address humanitarian agencies, they are 
helpful to them. The treaties oblige the states, in which the conflict takes 
place, to agree, under certain circumstances, to relief action. Relief action is 
humanitarian and impartial in nature. This gives agencies the 
legitimatisation to insist on access to the population in the area of conflict. 
Furthermore, the law emphasises the right of victims to receive 
humanitarian assistance. The purpose is to provided aid, which is essential 
for the survival of the civilian population, such as food and medical 
supplies.  
                                                          
13  Cf.: Mackintosh, Kate: The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International 
Humanitarian Law, HPG Report 5, Overseas Development Institute, London 2000, p.3. 
14  A further examination to what extend the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols justify and legitimise humanitarian relief action is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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II.3.2 Humanitarian Principles 
 
There are four basic principles of humanitarian action, to which 
humanitarian agencies repeatedly refer to: Humanity, Impartiality, 
Neutrality and Independence. A clear distinction of the four terms is 
difficult, since these are overlapping principles. 
 
II.3.2.1 Humanity 
 
“Humanity means to bring assistance without discrimination to the 
wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national 
capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be 
found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the 
human being.”15 
 
Civilians have fundamental rights under international humanitarian law. 
They have to be protected from attack, torture and other violations of their 
physical and moral integrity. The term humanitarian, as used in 
international humanitarian law, gives rights to and confers obligations on 
parties concerned by armed conflict. These are primarily the warring parties 
of the conflict and the victims, but also third states and international and 
NGOs. 
 
These basic premises lead to two major consequences: firstly, humanitarian 
assistance must not comprise any element that could contribute to the 
military effort. Secondly, the delivery of aid must be given by the sole 
criterion of need. Humanitarian action seeks to relieve suffering and to 
introduce into situations of conflict fundamental values of humanity, such 
as respect for life and human dignity. 
 
Humanitarian action can never be coercive. The use of force against the will 
of parties to a conflict, even for valid humanitarian reasons, for instance to 
ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance, would necessarily turn 
humanitarian action into a military operation. 
 
II.3.2.2 Impartiality 
 
                                                          
15  Cited from the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 
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“Impartiality means to make no discrimination as to nationality, race, 
religious beliefs, class or political opinions and to endeavours only to 
relieve suffering, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress.”16 
 
Jean Pictet identifies in his work on the fundamental principles of the Red 
Cross, three elements of impartiality.17 The first element is non-
discrimination as described in the common Article 3. This means not to 
discriminate any person because of, for example race, sex and religion.18 
The second element refers to the principle of proportionality. The principle 
relates to the delivery of relief according to needs. Relief programmes 
should always respond first to persons who are in the greatest need of aid. 
The degree of need should be the defining factor of any relief operation. In 
practical terms this does not necessarily mean equality of treatment, but it 
implies providing to individuals what is considered appropriate to cover 
their basic needs. The third element is that there should be no subjective 
distinction. Regardless the fact, whether the person, who receives aid, is 
guilty or innocent, deserves or not deserves humanitarian relief, should 
obtain aid based only on need. This principle is contrary to international 
refugee law. For example the UNHCR is not entitled to give assistance to 
persons, who are accused of international crimes. Consequently the 
international humanitarian community does not universally accept this 
aspect of the principle; it depends on the individual mandate of the 
particular organisation. 
 
II.3.2.3 Neutrality 
 
“In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not 
take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, 
racial, religious or ideological nature.”19 
 
The principles of Neutrality and Impartiality are often confused with one 
another. Nevertheless they are very different. In contrast to impartiality, 
neutrality applies on a different level. Neutrality is concerned with an 
NGO’s relation to belligerents, ideologies and politics, whereas impartiality 
aims at the non-discriminative treatment of the persons in need. 
                                                          
16  Cf.: footnote No. 15. 
17  Cf.: Pictet, Jean (1979): The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, [online] Henry 
Durant Institute, Geneva 1979, Available from: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/CA0A0120C2E90B02C1256C5B004466C0, [Accessed at: 8th 
May 2003]. 
18  Cf.: footnote No. 12. 
19  Cf.: footnote No. 15. 
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The Red Cross refers to different aspects of neutrality. Firstly, to military 
neutrality by stating that the organisation “may not take sides in hostilities.” 
Under the Geneva Convention, persons who deliver aid and relief enjoy 
special protection. They are placed above the conflict. In order to be 
respected by the opposing parties, they have to refrain from direct or 
indirect interference in military operations. Otherwise the universal 
character of the organisation would be compromised. The second aspect of 
neutrality is ideological neutrality. The Red Cross defined it as “not to 
engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or 
ideological nature.” By aligning the organisation to a certain ideology or 
political standpoint, a humanitarian organisation would run the risk of 
limiting its scope of action. Opposing parties with different ideologies 
would identify the NGO as a party to the conflict, which is contradictory to 
the sense of the Geneva Convention. It is essential for humanitarian 
operations to be perceived as ideologically neutral by the involved parties. 
Nevertheless, this is a great challenge in conflict situations, which are often 
highly politicised. It is important for humanitarian agencies to recognise 
politics without becoming a part of it or being manipulated by it. 
 
II.3.2.4 Independence 
 
“The Red Cross is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in 
the humanitarian service of their Governments and subject to the laws of 
their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they 
may be able at all times to act in accordance with the Red Cross 
principles.”20 
 
The conditions for recognition of new Red Cross National Societies give a 
more detailed description about the meaning of independence. These 
conditions refer to political, religious and economic independence. It is 
apparent that independence is the basis for impartiality and neutrality. 
Humanitarian organisations should only be obliged to their follow own 
Charter, principles and ideals that are derived from the Geneva 
Conventions. Being dependent, especially financially dependent, could limit 
the organisation’s decision-making ability, since a financial associate could 
try to gain control or intrude into the organisation’s politics by exercising 
financial pressure. The fact that the work of humanitarian agencies depends 
                                                          
20  Cf.: footnote No. 15. 
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mainly on donations makes the conditions difficult. However, it is essential 
to maintain credibility by strictly obeying this principle. 
 
II.4 Types of International Military Operations 
 
The scope and type of civil-military cooperation varies according to the 
nature and mandate under which an international military operation is 
carried out. Generally speaking the term operation “describes the 
deployment of external military personnel in a region of conflict to promote 
the maintenance of order and security”.21 C. Lang categorises three different 
types22: 
 
II.4.1 Combat operations 
 
Combat operations are military deployments, which are not mandated by a 
UN Security Council Resolution. Combat operations are in breach with 
Article 2 of the UN-Charter, the prohibition on the use of force. The 
intervening force is becoming a party to the conflict.23 
 
II.4.2 Peace Support Operations 
 
As already mentioned, the UN peacekeeping missions underwent significant 
changes in order to adapt to evolving conditions. The changes can be 
mainly subsumed under two aspects of peacekeeping missions, which are as 
follows: 
 
• New operational environment 
 The international peacekeeping forces are nowadays primarily 
deployed in countries affected by civil wars, conducted by different 
factions and irregular troops. These countries are often in conditions of 
weak security and humanitarian emergencies. 
• Expansion of purpose and objectives of mission 
 To address the broader security perception the peacekeeping forces are 
composed of civilian and military personnel. Missions are coordinated 
                                                          
21  Lilly, Damian (2002): The Peacebuilding Dimension of Civil-Military Relations in 
Complex Emergencies, International Alert, p.4. 
22  Cf.: Lang, Christoph (2001): Improving International Civil-Military Relations in 
Humanitarian Emergencies, Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation, Bern, 
p.7. 
23  A recent example for a combat operation according to this definition is the US-led war 
on Iraq in 2003. 
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with International Organisations and NGOs to deliver humanitarian 
assistance and to foster the process of post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
Within Peace Support Operations (PSO), there are two different types of 
operations, depending on the different mandates given to these operations: 
 
a. Peace Enforcement Operations 
 Peace enforcement operations are authorized under Chapter VII of the 
UN-Charta, “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace, and acts of aggression”. Chapter VII enables the UN to take 
coercive action against states and so operations takes place without the 
consent of the involved parties. Actions range from imposing 
economic sanctions, like embargos, to dispatching troops. The 
operation’s objective is to force the belligerents to accept a peace 
agreement. In other words, the UN Security Council can make war to 
end war. In practice, the UN Security Council delegates the job to 
other states or usually to a coalition of states.24 
 
b. Peacekeeping Operations  
 Peacekeeping operations are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN-
Charter.25 Chapter VI is titled “Pacific settlement of Disputes”. It 
promotes the settlement of disputes through peaceful means, such as 
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. The UN can deploy military 
personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, to help 
control the involved parties and to resolve the conflict. Peacekeeping 
takes place with the consent of the involved parties. Initially 
peacekeeping forces “created buffer zones, monitored ceasefires and 
implemented peace agreements”26. During the cold war era the UN 
primarily responded to inter-State conflicts, today’s peacekeeping 
operations are applied to intra-State conflicts and civil wars. The scope 
of activity has been enlarged to “creating political institutions, 
working alongside governments, non-governmental organizations and 
local citizens' groups to provide emergency relief, demobilize former 
fighters and reintegrate them into society, clear mines, organize and 
conduct elections and promote sustainable development”27. As a result 
                                                          
24  Examples for such a delegation of a peace enforcement operation are the Korean War in 
1950 and the Persian Gulf war in 1990/1. 
25  There are currently 13 UN peacekeeping operations in the field. (date: May 2003). 
26  United Nations peacekeeping, Question and Answers, Available from: http://www.un. 
org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ques.htm, [Accessed 8th May.2003]. 
27  ibid. 
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of this more comprehensive interpretation of UN peacekeeping 
operations, the number of civilians involved in operations has risen. 
Nevertheless, the presence of military personnel is still the 
determining factor. 
 
In theory, UN Operations under Chapter VI are a tool to facilitate a conflict 
resolution through diplomacy. But they are not authorised to achieve peace 
by the use of force. In practice, most of today’s UN peacekeeping 
operations are neither purely peacekeeping (Chapter VI) nor classical 
enforcement against an aggressor (Chapter VII). They fall somewhere 
between the two chapters. The literature often refers to operations under 
“Chapter six and a half”.28 
 
II.4.3 Military assistance to humanitarian crisis 
 
In this regard military assistance is not carried out within a military 
mandate. It is provided on request from civilian actors to carry out specific 
tasks for a defined period under civilian authority. 29 As already stated in the 
introduction of this paper, this document focuses only on the military-
humanitarian relationship in peace support operations. 
 
 
III. The NATO perspective on CIMIC 
 
The last Chapter explained how the term CIMIC developed from a 
collective term for any civil-military interaction and points of contact, to a 
term of military doctrine. To comprehend NATO’s perception of CIMIC it 
is of importance to take a closer look at its development from a defence 
alliance to a primary tool of Euro-Atlantic foreign policy starting with the 
end of the East-West conflict. Section two gives a brief review of the 
aspects that caused the development of the NATO CIMIC doctrine. Section 
three proceeds to explain the relevant components and implications of the 
doctrine in detail. Finally Section four summarises the main finding of this 
Chapter. 
 
                                                          
28  Moore, Mike (1995): UN Peacekeeping a Glass Half Empty, Half Full, In: Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists 51.3, p. 5-6. 
29  Examples are the deployment of the Bundeswehr during the Oderbruch in 2002 or the 
deployment of the US Army in the case of hurricane Mitch in 1998.  
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III.1 NATO’s Evolution: From a Defence Alliance to an Alliance of Mutual 
Interest  
 
At the end of the cold war era, NATO faced an intensive discussion about 
the organisation’s legitimacy. The fall of the Berlin wall, the ongoing 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact 
in 1991 had made NATO’s former enemy and counterweight disappear. 
Hence the existing concept of NATO’s primary responsibility as a Defence 
Alliance, directed at the former communist states, had to be rethought. 
 
As a result the organisation adopted its first political Strategic Concept at 
the NATO-Summit in Rome in 199130, and at the same time, its military-
strategic implementation through the Military Committee by the MC 400 
doctrine. Through different tools, particularly the Partnership for Peace 
Programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO managed to 
develop a network of member states, the former Warsaw Pact states and 
Non-Aligned nations, which gave the Alliance a new justification for 
existence. 
 
The ongoing dramatic changes in the geopolitical landscape in the 1990s 
made further adjustments of the Alliance’s strategy necessary. In autumn 
1997 NATO mandated the revision of the Strategic Concept. Finally at the 
Washington Summit in 1999 the heads of states and the heads of 
government approved the New Strategic Concept.31 Supplemented by 
additional agreements, like Berlin Plus, the Defence Capabilities Initiative 
(DCI), and the Initiative against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD-
Initiative), the Alliance had been re-aligned for new tasks of the 21st 
century. 
 
In particular, one of the key issues was whether NATO should get involved 
in ‘out of area’ missions. The war in the Balkans contributed to NATO’s 
new self-conception. A war in Europe, close to the majority of the member 
states, with all its immense human suffering and close media coverage, 
constituted a moral challenge to the Alliance. The ineffectiveness of the 
United Nations culminating in the tragedy of Srebrenica paved the way for 
NATO action in the Balkans. The deployment of IFOR in December 1995 
                                                          
30  Cf.: NATO: Rome Declaration on Peace and Security, [online], Press Communiqué S-
1(91)86, Available from: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm, 
[Accessed 4th May 2003]. 
31  Cf.: NATO (1999): The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, 
Brussels. 
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represented the first response to ‘out of area’ demands.32 NATO went on its 
first ‘out-of-area’ mission. IFOR represents the starting point from which 
NATO developed to a leading multinational institution in the area of 
conflict prevention and PSO. 
 
The Non-Article-5-Operations33, in NATO terms, became a primary task for 
the Alliance. This is reflected in the Strategic Concept of 1999 (SC 99). It 
emphasises that the changed geopolitical environment requires a broader 
security approach. 
 
“The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which 
recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental 
factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension.”34 
 
It also determines that the Euro-Atlantic community is facing a different set 
of more complex risks. 
 
“… the appearance of new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, 
including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of 
political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”35  
 
The SC 99 stresses the valuable experiences in the Balkans. IFOR and 
SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina are seen as a proof of the Alliance’s ability to 
operate outside Article 5. Although collective defence is still a core part of 
the strategy36, the Concept emphasises the need for capabilities to manage 
conflicts outside NATO territory, including armed response to crises37. 
NATO distinguishes between Collective Defence Operations (CDO) and 
Crisis Response Operations (CRO). 
 
Within a decade NATO managed a strategic turnaround from a collective 
defence alliance to an alliance committed to the defence of mutual interests 
                                                          
32  For example Manfred Wörner, NATO Secretary-General from 1988 until 1994, 
repeatedly pleaded for NATO “out-of-area” missions, to take on a greater responsibility 
for the world’s peace and security; Cf. also: Robert, B. (1996): NATO and the End of 
Cold War, NATO Research, [online], Available from: http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/ 
94-96/mccalla/index.htm, [Accessed 22th May 2003]. 
33  Article 5 of the Washington Treaty declares that an attack on one of its members is an 
attack on all members. NATO refers to all other military operations, which are not 
conducted under Article 5 as Non-Article-5-Operations. 
34  NATO: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, op. cit, Para. 25. 
35  NATO: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, op. cit, Para. 3, 20-23. 
36  Cf.: NATO: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, op. cit., Para. 20. 
37  Cf.: NATO: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, op. cit., Para. 31, 32. 
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and an effective and vital tool of Euro-Atlantic foreign policy. The 
resolution of the Madrid summit in 2003 undoubtedly shows NATO’s will 
to focus not only on Europe, but also to be prepared to play its role on a 
worldwide scale.38 However recent developments during the prelude of the 
US/UK-led war on Iraq in 2003 also showed the limitations of an Alliance, 
which consists of a great number of different players. 
III.2 Evolution of the NATO CIMIC Doctrine 
 
The experiences of the IFOR and SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
have been essential to the evolution of NATO’s CIMIC doctrine. Until 1995 
CIMIC was not seen as very important. It was seen as presenting “a little 
more than a logistic challenge.”39  
 
Based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1031, a NATO-led 
multinational force was mandated to start the IFOR mission in December 
1995. IFOR’s major responsibility was the implementation of the military 
aspects of the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)40. At 
first the relations with non-military organisations were reactive and only 
supportive. IFOR assisted the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent (ICRC). By spring 1996 IFOR had succeeded in establishing a 
secure environment. This paved the way for the implementation of the 
civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. Non-military organisations could 
start their work. Simultaneously IFOR became increasingly involved in 
humanitarian support, national elections, longer-term projects, and 
infrastructure reconstruction.41 
 
This shift in IFOR’s responsibility raised the awareness for the necessity of 
a CIMIC policy and special CIMIC forces to support NATO commanders in 
PSO and “out of area” missions. Soon after IFOR’s start a CIMIC cell was 
established at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). 
The cell was responsible for the definition of training requirements and the 
preparation of training programmes. In 1997, the Military Committee 
                                                          
38  The ministers approved NATO’s take over of the lead role of the mission in Afghanistan 
and also the support for the Polish troops in Iraq. Furthermore they agreed on the 
creation of a new key tool, the NATO Response Force. It will be a robust rapid reaction 
fighting force that can be quickly deployed anywhere in the world. 
39  NATO (2001): AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine, Draft from 
18.06.2001, Brussels, Para. 101. 
40  The GFAP is better known under the term Dayton Peace Agreement. 
41  Cf.: Phillips, William R. (1998): Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to peace 
implementation in Bosnia, In: NATO Review Web edition, Volume 46, No. 1, p. 23. 
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established the MC-411 NATO CIMIC Policy. At the beginning of 1998, 
SHAPE developed the CIMIC 2000 directive, which represented, from that 
point, the basis for any future plans and actions.42 
 
The personnel structure of the Civil-Military Task Force (CMTF) was 
another factor that contributed to the development of NATO’s CIMIC 
policy. The CMTF was formed in support for the IFOR and SFOR mission 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the majority of the personnel were provided by 
the USA. Since the European members of NATO wanted to be more 
involved in the ‘new NATO’, this imbalance needed to be changed. The 
objective was to raise the non-US share to 50 percent. Despite this, most 
European countries lacked qualified personnel. SHAPE started to carry out 
CIMIC trainings and finally the CMTF was restructured into the CIMIC 
Task Force (CIMIC TF), in which the Europeans had a significant higher 
share of personnel.43 
 
The events and experiences in the Balkans made a comprehensive CIMIC 
policy inevitable. This is evident since the SC 99 explicitly refers to CIMIC. 
The concept emphasises the importance of CIMIC to successfully complete 
military operations: 
 
“The interaction between the Alliances forces and the civil environment 
(both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial 
to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: 
military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at same 
time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, 
communication, medical support, and public affairs. Cooperation between 
the Alliance’s military and civil bodies will accordingly remain essential.”44 
 
As a response to the changed international environment, NATO prepared 
itself for new tasks. Especially driven by the experiences through the 
deployment of forces in the Balkans, the Alliance’s, gradually, discovered 
the need for a coherent and institutionalised CIMIC policy. “Out of area” 
operations in territories, where the military forces cannot rely on 
functioning civil institutions and/or functioning infrastructure, presented 
different and more complex challenges. The development of CIMIC plays 
an important role in order to meet these challenges. 
                                                          
42  Cf.: Braunstein, Peter (2000): CIMIC 2000 – Zivil-militärische Kooperation, In: 
Europäische Sicherheit, Volume 49, No. 12, p. 49. 
43  Cf.: Phillips, William R., Civil-Military Cooperation, op. cit., p. 24. 
44  NATO: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, op. cit., Para.60. 
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III.3 The NATO CIMIC Doctrine in Detail 
 
The MC 411/1 and the Allied Joint Publication AJP-9 are the key 
documents of NATO’s CIMIC policy. In July 2001 the North Atlantic 
Council approved the revised MC 411/1. The purpose of this document is 
the establishment of a NATO military policy on CIMIC.45 Whereas the 
AJP-9 “provides the guidelines for the planning and execution of CIMIC in 
support of operations involving NATO military forces.”46 After the 
expiration of the period of objection in 2002, the AJP-9 has been tacitly 
approved by the member states.  
 
This chapter takes a detailed look at the implications, components and 
objectives of the NATO CIMIC doctrine. It gives a definition of NATO 
CIMIC and clarifies the purpose of the doctrine. It continues with a 
demarcation of CIMIC from other components of Civil-Military Relation 
and identifies the key functions of CIMIC. NATO’s perception of its 
relationship with humanitarian players in a theatre of operations is 
examined and the chapter concludes with an analysis of NATO’s attitude 
towards military involvement in humanitarian action.  
 
III.3.1 Definition and Purpose of CIMIC 
 
NATO’s definition of CIMIC can be found in the MC 411/1 doctrine. 
 
“CIMIC facilitates co-operation between a NATO commander and all parts 
of the civilian environment within his Joint Operations Area (JOA). CIMIC 
is: The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between 
the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and 
local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental 
organisations and agencies.”47 
 
The purpose of NATO’s CIMIC policy is also described in the MC 411/1 
doctrine. 
 
“The immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-
operation of the NATO commander and the civilian authorities, 
                                                          
45  NATO (2001): MC4II/I. – NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, 
Military Council, Brussels, Para. 2. 
46  Cf.: Ibid., Para. 14a. 
47  Ibid., Para. 4. 
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organisations, agencies and population within a commander's area of 
operations in order to allow him to fulfil his mission. This may include 
direct support to the implementation of a civil plan. The long-term purpose 
of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the 
achievement of Alliance objectives in operations.”48 
 
Looking more closely at the two definitions, three characteristics can be 
determined. Firstly, CIMIC, as a term, refers to a military operation and not 
to the civil-military cooperation as such. The military goal remains 
supreme. Secondly, CIMIC points not towards facilitating humanitarian aid 
by NGOs or IOs as an objective in itself. Thirdly, the definitions imply that 
CIMIC is a tactical doctrine, not a strategy. The strategy of a military 
operation can aim at stability and reduction of security risks for the 
population in a crisis area. CIMIC is being used as an instrument to reach 
the given objectives.49 NATO has identified CIMIC as a crucial feature to 
successful accomplishment of military operations. CIMIC is then more an 
integrated part of the command structure and the overall military strategy, 
than a stand-alone activity: “CIMIC has to be an integral part of the entire 
operation, requiring close co-ordination with other military capabilities and 
actions.” 50 
 
III.3.2 Scope of the CIMIC Doctrine 
 
Although NATO’s involvement in the Balkans gave the main impetus to the 
development of CIMIC; CIMIC is not seen as an instrument restricted to 
support PSOs. CIMIC is considered in Non-Article-5 CROs as well as 
Article-5 CDOs.51. It is an integral part in the whole spectrum of NATO 
operations. However NATO determines that the application of CIMIC 
differs between CDOs and CROs. 
 
According to MC 411/1, not in every case of cooperation between civil 
organisations and the military is defined as CIMIC. CIMIC is one element 
of Civil-Military Relations (CIMIR). This raises the question what the other 
parts of CIMIR are and how does NATO differentiating CIMIC from them. 
                                                          
48  Ibid., Para. 9; Cf. also: NATO, AJP-9, op. cit, Para. 105, “The long-term purpose of 
CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of 
Alliance objectives in operations.” 
49  Cf.: NATO, AJP-9, op. cit, Para. 104: “CIMIC is a Commander’s tool in establishing 
and maintaining (…) relationships.” 
50  Ibid., Para. 15. 
51  Nevertheless NATO acknowledges that at present a CRO is more likely than a CDO; 
Cf.: NATO: MC 411/1, op. cit., Para. 3; Cf. also: NATO: AJP-9, op. cit., Para. 308, 311 
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The MC 411/1 doctrine identifies three additional parts of CIMIR: Firstly 
Civil-Emergencies Planning (CEP), secondly Military Assistance in 
Humanitarian Emergencies (MAHE) and thirdly Host Nation Support 
(HNS).52  
 
CEP refers to the protection and support of the domestic population in event 
of war. These actions are not CIMIC. MAHE refers to the case when 
military capabilities are for the use and under the command of civilian 
organisations. If the assistance is not part of a NATO military operation, it 
is not considered to be CIMIC. In such a case the MC 334 doctrine, which 
describes the use of “Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)” applies.53 
This will be in the case a disaster relief operation or other civil emergencies. 
Nevertheless NATO is also taking situations into account, where tasks of a 
non-military nature under NATO responsibility have to be undertaken in 
order to support a military mission. Especially in the first phase of a Non-
Article-5 CROs, but also during Article 5 CDOs, it is likely that in the 
theatre of operation a functioning civilian authority is absent. It can also not 
be assumed that enough civil capacities are available to respond to 
humanitarian emergencies.54 In this case it can be necessary to provide 
humanitarian assistance.  
 
Assistance that is required in support of military operations qualifies as 
CIMIC. As a basic principle assistance should be subsidiary to an 
appropriate organisation, such as the UN. If this is not possible, it will be 
carried out within the chain of command.55 In general, NATO’s CIMIC 
policy defines military involvement in tasks of a non-military nature, 
normally the responsibility of a mandated civil authority. 
 
HNS refers to the support of a NATO operation by the nation on whose 
territory the mission is conducted. NATO draws a thin line between HNS 
and CIMIC. According to the doctrine HNS concerns the provision of civil 
and military assistance in the form of material, facilities, services and 
administrative support to the force. CIMIC’s role is to provide co-ordination 
and liaison that will assist in making the civil resources available.56 CIMIC 
is therefore not equated with HNS, but complementary to it. 
 
                                                          
52  NATO, MC 411/1, op.cit., Para. 5-7. 
53  Ibid., Para 6. 
54  Cf.: NATO: AJP-9, op. cit., Para. 807. 
55  Cf.: Ibid., Para. 807; Cf. also: NATO: MC 411/1, op. cit., Para. 6. 
56  Cf.: NATO, AJP-9, op. cit., Para. 401. 
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The distinction of CIMIC from other aspects of civil-military relations, as 
described above, shows that NATO is using a very narrow interpretation of 
CIMIC. In NATO’s understanding, CIMIC has a purely supportive function 
to assist the successful accomplishment of a military operation. Subsidiary 
assistance, which is not a part of a military mandate with military-political 
objectives, is not considered to be CIMIC. 
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III.3.3 Functions of CIMIC 
 
As mentioned above, CIMIC is seen as a supportive and integral part of an 
operation. To guarantee support at the best possible level, the doctrine 
differentiates CIMIC tasks according to three different stages of the life 
cycle of an operation.57 At the pre-operational stage the CIMIC staff help 
the force to prepare them to deal with the civilian conditions they will meet 
in the JOA. CIMIC tasks during the operational stage are to secure effective 
civil-military cooperation, establishment and maintenances of relationships 
with civilian bodies, in support of the Commander’s mission. At the 
transitional stage CIMIC assists the hand-over of civil related activities to 
the proper, mandated authorities.  
 
NATO subsumes CIMIC tasks according to three core functions:58 
 
1. Civil-Military Liaison 
2. Support to the civil environment 
3. Support to force 
 
‘Civil-Military Liaison’ aims at the creation of necessary coordination with 
civilian bodies to “facilitate and support the planning and conduct of 
operations.”59 The coordination should already be established before the 
actual operation starts. ‘Civil-Military Liaison’s’ purpose is to guarantee the 
Alliance’s readiness and ability to timely and adequately response. 
Establishment, promotion and maintenances of coordination are seen as a 
pre-condition for the other CIMIC functions. ‘Civil-Military Liaison’s’ 
objective is also to help to obtain the support of the population, IOs and 
NGOs.  
 
‘Support for the civil environment’ refers to the interaction with civilian 
bodies during a military operation. In a theatre of operations a wide range of 
military support is conceivable, for example information, material and 
equipment, communications and transport facilities. NATO is conscious of 
the threat of blurring civil and military roles. Hence it is explicitly stated 
that a support decision should always take political, civil and military 
factors into account and should be made at the “highest appropriate level”.60 
                                                          
57  Cf.: Ibid., Para. 303. 
58  Cf.: Ibid., Para. 106. 
59  Ibid., Para. 106a. 
60  Ibid., Para. 106b. 
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The doctrine also states that this will generally only take place when it is 
necessary to the fulfilment of the military mission. 
‘Support to force deals’ with situations that require civil support to the 
military. Paragraph 106c in the AJP-9 emphasises that in circumstances of 
partial dependence on such factors as civil support, regarding resources, 
information. Civil control of the military operation has to be avoided. 
 
Recapitulating, the function of CIMIC is to establish the best possible 
conditions for the conduct of a military operation, regarding external 
support and recognition by minimising any possible external disruption to 
the mission. 
 
III.3.4 Relationship with Humanitarian Players 
 
The NATO CIMIC doctrine anticipates cooperation with various actors.61 
This part focuses on the relationship with organisations involved in relief 
assistance. The NATO CIMIC doctrine stresses repeatedly the diversity of 
civilian organisations and agencies, which the military forces must 
cooperate with. It also emphasises that it is of crucial importance for the 
CIMIC staff to fully understand the mandate, role, structure, methods and 
principles of these organisations in order to establish effective relationships. 
NATO differentiates between four types of civilian organisations and gives 
the following definitions of its potential counterparts in theatre of 
operations:62 
 
1. International Organisations (IOs) 
 The characteristics of IOs are that they are established by 
intergovernmental agreements and they operate at the international 
level. In particular the doctrine mentions the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations 
Organisations, such as for example OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR. 
 
 Due to its unique role the International Committee of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC) belongs also to this group. The 
ICRC was not established by an intergovernmental agreement, but it 
fulfils a role based on the Geneva Conventions. 
 
2. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
                                                          
61  Cf.: NATO: MC 411/1, op. cit., Para. 8. 
62  Cf.: NATO: AJP-9, op. cit., Para. 802. 
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 NGOs are defined as voluntary organisations, which are independent 
of governments, international organisations and commercial interests. 
They are subdivided into: 
a. Mandated 
 NGOs are officially recognised by the lead organisation in a 
crisis and is authorised to work in this area. 
b. Non-Mandated 
 NGOs have no official recognition or authorisation. They work 
as a private concern. 
 
3. International and National Government Donor Agencies 
 In this group belong the national and international organisations, 
which are responsible for the funding, monitoring and evaluation of 
the development programmes. Examples are ECHO, USAID and 
DFID. 
 
4. Other Groupings 
a. Civilian Development Agencies 
 In this category NATO subsumes all civilian organisations, 
which are mainly concerned with reconstruction and are 
mandated to provide technical assistance. CIMIC tasks in this 
regard are the identification of the requirements for 
reconstruction in collaboration with the local government and 
where applicable the lead agency. 
b. Human Rights and Democratisation Agencies 
 This group comprises the primary the UNHCR, ODHIR and the 
OSCE.  
 
NATO accounts for the diversity of civilian players and with that the 
complications, which can derive from different organisation cultures, 
different mandates and objectives between the military and civilian 
organisations.63 Generally the CIMIC doctrine defines that social, political, 
cultural, religious, economic, ecological and humanitarian factors have to be 
consider during planning and execution of an operation.64  
 
The AJP-9 doctrine defines several principles for the civil-military 
relationship.65 In order to handle CIMIC at the best possible level, the 
                                                          
63  Cf.: NATO: MC 411/1, op. cit., Para. 8. 
64  Cf.: Ibid., Para. 8. 
65  Cf.: NATO: AJP-9, op. cit., Para, 207–212. 
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doctrine phrases the principles of ‘transparency’ and ‘communication’. 
Being transparent, demonstrating competence and capability should foster 
mutual trust and confidence. Communication should be open and constant. 
Responsibility and decision-making should be guide by the principles of 
‘consent’ and ‘shared responsibility’. ‘Shared responsibility’ is explicitly 
acknowledging different ethos, structures and working practices. 
Agreements on common goals should lead to an agreed sharing of 
responsibilities. NATO seeks arrangements on a consensual basis to achieve 
best possible results. In principle coercive action, to push through NATO’s 
viewpoint, is perceived as possible, but little effective in the long run. 
 
The AJP-9 doctrine gives additional instructions. In Paragraph 203 the 
commanders of an operation are addressed to be aware of the impact of 
military action on civil goals. They are instructed to seek balance between 
military and civilian objectives. Important is that NATO explicitly 
determines “CIMIC implies neither military control of civilian organisations 
or agencies nor the reverse.”66 Nevertheless NATO clearly claims civilian 
support to the military. 
 
“The military will often require access to local civilian resources. In such 
circumstances every effort will be made to avoid adverse impact on local 
populations, economies, environment, infrastructure or the work of the 
humanitarian organisations.” 
 
It is apparent that the military goal stays in all circumstances supreme. The 
Alliance adheres to the principle of ‘mission primacy’. NATO is not 
demanding control of civil bodies and is considerate of the position of 
civilian organisations. To what extend NATO is really going to be 
considerate in a specific operation, cannot be answered by the doctrines. 
 
III.3.5 Military Humanitarian Action 
 
In general, the NATO CIMIC doctrine emphasises that the Alliance’s 
responsibility are solely security related tasks. If applicable, consistent with 
the OPLAN and the mandated civil authorities, support for the 
implementation of civil tasks can be given.67 These tasks have to be 
conducted subsidiary to the appropriate civil authority. It seems apparent 
that the phrase refers to the Alliance’s experiences in the Balkans. Initially 
                                                          
66  NATO: MC 411/1, op. cit., Para. 11. 
67  Cf.: Ibid., Para. 11a. 
 
 
37
 
IFOR and later SFOR, the sucessor mission, gave support to civil bodies in 
various areas. SFOR even had the explicit mandate of the international 
community to participate in the implementation of civilian aspects of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. The assistance ranged from humanitarian 
support, national elections, longer-term projects, and infrastructure 
reconstruction.68 Further on the doctrine addresses the problem of confusing 
the roles of the military and civilian bodies by stating that all measures will 
be taken to avoid adverse effects and compromising the neutrality and 
impartiality of humanitarian organisations.69 
 
NATO also acknowledges that within a military operation circumstances 
can arise, which requires a take-over of tasks that are normally the 
responsibility of civil bodies and which are not conducted subsidiary to the 
appropriate civilian body. This raises the question which circumstances 
could trigger an engagement of the military in the humanitarian sector and 
according to what principles NATO carries out these tasks. 
 
The take-over of non-military tasks under the Alliance’s own responsibility 
is only envisaged in exceptional circumstances. 
 
“In exceptional circumstances, the military may be required to take on tasks 
normally the responsibility of a mandated civil authority, organisation or 
agency. These tasks will only be taken on where the appropriate civil body 
is not present or is unable to carry out its mandate and where an otherwise 
unacceptable vacuum would arise. The military should be prepared to 
undertake, when requested by the cognisant civil authority and approved by 
NATO, such tasks necessary, until the mandated civil authority, 
organisation or agency is prepared to assume them.”70 
 
The AJP-9 doctrine gives a further explanation for ‘exceptional 
circumstances.’ It quotes that these tasks will be carried out “(...) to meet 
immediate life sustaining needs of the local population and/or to ensure the 
stability and long-term sustainability of the society (...)“71 
 
The AJP-9 mentions the need for an exit strategy. In Paragraph 303e cites 
that these tasks will be conducted within the context of a plan of transition. 
 
                                                          
68  Cf.: Phillips, William R.: Civil-Military Cooperation, op. cit., p. 25. 
69  Cf.: NATO: MC 411/1, op. cit., Para. 11e. 
70  Ibid., Para. 11b. 
71  NATO: AJP-9, op. cit., Para. 305e. 
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Recapitulating, NATO sets the following requirements for a take-over of 
any activities of a non-military nature, which are not subsidiary to a civil 
authority: 
The civil authority has to absent or not able to carry out its mandate. The 
absence has to cause an unacceptable vacuum, which cannot be filled by 
another civilian body. The population in need would face an immediate life 
sustain threat, if NATO would not carry out the humanitarian tasks and 
finally there has to exist a plan of transition to hand over the responsibilities 
to the appropriate civil authority as soon as possible. 
 
III.4 Summary 
 
NATO’s role and status has significantly changed in the last decade. The 
former alliance of deterrence as a counterweight to the Eastern Block has 
been transformed to a powerful and worldwide key player in the arena of 
Peace Support Operations. This is a result of the redefinition of NATO’s 
security perception and it has been managed through structural realignment. 
The Alliance’s has become a highly effective tool of western foreign policy 
to response to the so-called new threats.  
 
The experiences of the Alliance’s first military operations outside its own 
territory, in the Balkans, showed the necessity of a coherent and well-
defined management of the civil-military interface. The Balkans has been 
the cradle of the CIMIC doctrine. However the application of CIMIC is not 
restricted to PSOs, although the incentives to the development of CIMIC are 
in close connection to the experiences of IFOR and SFOR.  
 
The concerns of the humanitarian community have entered the NATO 
CIMIC doctrine. NATO seems to be aware of the problems, which are 
caused by making military and humanitarian roles indistinct. It implies that 
the Alliance’s recognised that the humanitarian endeavours have to 
maintain a certain distance from the military. The CIMIC doctrine clearly 
determines the necessity of being aware of differences in mandates and 
cultures. 
 
CIMIC is a tactical doctrine, which objective can be the support of 
humanitarian actors or the take-over of tasks with a humanitarian character. 
However, it is important to understand that this not the primal aim of 
CIMIC. NATO clearly states its intention to adhere to the principle of 
‘mission primacy’. First of all, CIMIC serves as a combat-support function. 
NATO uses a narrow interpretation. Activities, which are directly function 
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as assistance to a successful accomplishment of a military operation, are 
considered to be a part of CIMIC. CIMIC is designed to obtain and 
guarantee the best possible support, recognition and acceptance for the 
military mission and simultaneously minimising external interference 
during an operation. Consequently CIMIC aspires not to exert to control 
over civilian bodies. NATO believes that a high degree of acceptance by the 
population and the local authority is essential to the success of a military 
undertaking. In this regard possible engagement in humanitarian tasks is not 
seen as the Alliance’s focal point, nevertheless it is considered to be an 
ancillary activity within the wider objective of mission acceptance.  
 
Generally, military support for the implementation of civilian task has to be 
conducted subsidiary to a civilian body. Only in exceptional circumstances 
that have to meet specific criteria, NATO envisaged the direct conduct of 
humanitarian action. It is apparent that the Alliance’s aspires not to become 
a humanitarian player; it still considers the successful accomplishment of 
security-related tasks its core business. The former UNPROFOR 
commander and Belgium General F. Briquemont commented. “The military 
cannot take the place of humanitarian organisations, which have their own 
objectives and methods and their own know-how; it is clearly useless to try 
to outdo the ICRC or UNHCR.”72 Nevertheless, it has also to be mentioned, 
that the military is controlled and mandated by politicians. It is a tool of 
politics and therefore dependent on it. If it is political opportune to get the 
military involved in humanitarian activities, on the basis of political 
objectives to maintain public support or to serve as a substitute for a direct 
political or military addressing of the root causes of a conflict, NATO will 
have a difficult tasks to avoid this kind of involvement. 
 
IV. The ICRC Perspective on CIMIC 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the position of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross on Civil-Military Cooperation. Section one 
offers a brief overview of the status and mandate of the ICRC. Section two 
sets out the ICRC’s understanding of CIMIC, while Section three proceeds 
with an analysis of the organisation’s position on military involvement in 
humanitarian activities. The ICRC defined several areas, where cooperation 
with the military might be necessary and drew up specific principles for 
such cooperation. In Section four these points of contact are explained in 
                                                          
72  As quoted in: Studer, Meinrad; The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict, 
op. cit., p. 376. 
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detail. The organisation defined three different strategies to respond to the 
increased necessity of cooperation with the military, which are discussed in 
Section five. Finally Section six presents a summary of the main findings. 
 
IV.1 General 
 
The ICRC has a unique role in the international community. The ICRC is a 
private humanitarian organisation, which has a status of its own.  
 
“The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose 
exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of 
victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It 
directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the 
Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering 
by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal 
humanitarian principles.”73 
 
It is formally recognised in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols. It has therefore an exclusive role as a guardian of the 
international humanitarian law. The ICRC has led the way for modern days 
NGOs. It also plays a leading role in setting standards for codes of conduct 
for the humanitarian community and the perpetuation of the humanitarian 
principles. As an example the Code of Conduct for the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations 
in Disaster in Relief can be seen as fundamental to every NGOs work. 
 
IV.2 Understanding of CIMIC 
 
Contrary to many humanitarian actors, the ICRC distinguishes between 
CIMIC and CIMIR. The organisation is aware of the fuzzy interpretations 
of CIMIC and in its interpretation CIMIC describes first and foremost a 
military function. Therefore the ICRC uses the term CIMIC only when 
referring to the NATO or EU military doctrines. It also refrains from 
describing its own relations with the military as CIMIC. However, taking a 
look at the whole range of ICRC publications, the mixing of the terms 
CIMIC and CIMIR is still noticeable. It would be desirable if a further 
differentiation in the ICRC publication would be promoted. 
                                                          
73  ICRC mission statement, Available from: http://www.icrc.org/HOME.NSF/ 
060a34982cae 624ec12566fe00326312/125ffe2d4c7 f68acc1256ae300394f6e? 
OpenDocument, [Accessed 15th May 2003]. 
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IV.3 Military Humanitarian Action 
 
When assessing direct military involvement in humanitarian tasks, the 
ICRC makes a differentiation between such an involvement in a post-
conflict environment or during a conflict.74 
 
The ICRC has few reservations regarding the involvement of the military in 
humanitarian tasks in post-conflict situations. Since the threat of being 
associated with one of the warring parties has diminished, even the delivery 
of direct aid by the military is not ruled out. However, the ICRC points out 
that in the case of renewed hostilities humanitarian work closely linked to 
the military can cause problems. 
 
With respect to military engagement in the “humanitarian space” during a 
PSO in a conflict area the ICRC has a more assertive position. It reflects 
mainly the basic concerns of the whole humanitarian community.75 
 
Firstly, the ICRC opposes any direct involvement of the military in 
humanitarian activities, to avoid that the perception by the local authorities 
and the population that humanitarian action is associated with political and 
military objectives. The ICRC calls for a clear distinction in character 
between PSOs and humanitarian activities. 
 
The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR)76, which is a 
coalition of the nine largest international humanitarian organisations and of 
which the ICRC is member, has formulated a more detailed position of 
military implementation of humanitarian assistance.77 The SCHR makes a 
differentiation between direct military implementation of humanitarian 
assistance in “General Circumstances” and in “Exceptional Circumstances”. 
                                                          
74  Studer, Meinrad: The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict, op. cit., p. 374 
et seq. 
75  The ICRC has published a position paper dealing with the ICRC’s position on 
“Humanitarian Intervention”; Ryniker, Anne (2001): The ICRC’s position on 
humanitarian intervention, In: IRRC, Volume 83, No. 842, p. 527-532. 
76  Besides the ICRC are the following eight NGOs also members of the SCHR: Oxfam, 
Care, Save the Children, International Federation of the Red Cross, World Council of 
Churches, Caritas, Lutheran World Federation and Médecins sans Frontières.  
77  Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (2002): Position Paper on 
Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance, Geneva, 
p. 3 et seq. 
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“General Circumstances” are defined as a situation where sufficient 
humanitarian organisations operate in the respective area to address 
adequately humanitarian needs. The SCHR position paper notes that in such 
situations, it is never appropriate for the military to take action in the 
humanitarian field. It explicitly refers to situations where national military 
peacekeeping contingents implement quick impact style projects, such as 
minor infrastructure projects.78 Projects of this kind are mainly conducted 
for international publicity and psychological reasons in order to maintain 
public support for the mission and to improve staff morale. The SCHR 
asserts that these actions are intended to ensure the success of the military 
mission and cannot be viewed as humanitarian. The SCHR objects to the 
involvement of the military in such circumstances. 
 
“Exceptional Circumstances” are defined as a situation where the 
humanitarian agencies do not have the means and/or logistic capacities to 
respond to immediate humanitarian threats. These situations arise as a 
combination of for example sudden large-scale refugee influx, which leaves 
the humanitarian organisation a very narrow time frame to respond. In these 
circumstances military implementation of humanitarian assistance is seen as 
not being ideal, but acceptable, to fill the gap until the respective civilian 
agencies can take over and replace the military. The military involvement 
has to be clearly time-bound and the tasks have to be handed over as soon 
as possible. Furthermore the SCHR paper argues that these circumstances 
are extremely rare. In the 1990s there were only three occasions which 
justified military involvement according to this definition – Northern Iraq 
1991, Eastern Zaire 1994 and Albania/Macedonia 1999.79 However the 
paper also highlights the problem that a coherent policy to determine an 
exceptional circumstance does not exist and consequently this leaves a 
broad scope for interpretations. 
 
IV.4 Relevant Areas of Cooperation 
 
The ICRC identifies for its organisation several points of contacts with the 
military, where cooperation is thinkable, necessary or even desired.80 These 
                                                          
78  An example for such a “hearts and minds” operation was the support of the German 
KFOR brigade for major house repair projects in Kosovo in 1999. 
79  Cf.: Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response: Humanitarian-Military Relations, 
op. cit., p. 4. 
80  Cf.: Studer, Meinrad: The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict, op. cit., p. 
378 et seqq. 
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are namely the following five areas: Dialogue with political and military 
decision-makers, operational cooperation with peacekeeping forces, armed 
protection, the use of civil and military assets and training. 
IV.4.1 Dialogue with Political and Military Policy-Makers 
 
The ICRC’s strategy is to establish and maintain dialogue with the political 
and military policy-makers, which are responsible for the policy for military 
intervention. These consultations should already take place in the 
preparatory phase of peacekeeping missions, as well as throughout every 
phase of the operation. The ICRC focuses on the main player, such as the 
UN, NATO and the EU. The dialogue seeks to set up contacts that are 
useful for operational cooperation, as well as the promotion of the ICRC’s 
view of humanitarian action. Consequently the ICRC commits itself also to 
active participation at relevant conferences.  
 
IV.4.2 Operational Cooperation with Peacekeeping Forces 
 
By operational cooperation with peacekeeping forces the ICRC refers to 
liaison with the military in a theatre of operations. The ICRC’s position is to 
actively foster the contact with all relevant military actors. If necessary the 
Movement will assign special liaison personnel to maintain and establish 
contacts, not only with the military in the field, also with the relevant 
political and military authorities at headquarter level. The objectives of 
liaison are, first, to exchange relevant information regarding the work in the 
field, as the forces usually play a crucial role in sharing situation analyses 
with humanitarian agencies, especially on questions related to security. 
Second, the objective is to urge the authorities to clearly define the 
mandates of its forces regarding its humanitarian implications, and thirdly, 
to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. 
 
IV.4.3 Use of Armed Protection 
 
In a theatre of operation two different cases for armed protection can be 
necessary. The protecting of convoys by armed escorts and the protection of 
equipment and distribution sites by armed security against crime and 
looting. The ICRC draws upon the following principles to asses, whether 
armed protection should be used or not. 
 
IV.4.3.1 Armed Escorts 
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The Resolution V of the 1995 Council of Delegate defines guidelines for the 
use of armed escorts and armed protection that are binding for the whole 
movement.81 As a general and basic principle the resolution states that any 
use of any armed protection for any component of the Movement is 
prohibited. A use of armed protection is in conflict with the fundamental 
principles; humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality. However 
the resolution also defines exceptional cases, where, under particular 
conditions, the use of armed protection is allowed. The following criteria 
have to be fulfilled: 
 
• Needs have to be exceptional by pressing and they can only be met 
with armed escorts. 
• Use of armed escorts must not have a detrimental effect on the security 
of the intended beneficiaries. 
• No other agency or external body is capable of covering the needs. 
• Armed escort is primarily considered for its deterrent value and not for 
its fire-power. 
• The authority controlling the territory has to give its full approval for a 
armed escort. 
• The use of armed escort should be intended to provide protection 
against bandits and common criminals. There should be no risk of 
confrontation with an actual party to the conflict. 
 
Armed escorts can be either provided by reputable private companies, the 
police or military personnel. The resolution gives special instructions for the 
provision of an armed escort by the UN in a PSO. It states to take into 
account that in many cases the UN forces are not perceived as neutral to the 
conflict. The belligerents and/or the population may even consider them as 
hostile and the Movement has to be aware that collaboration with the UN 
bears the danger of compromising the principles of the ICRC. Even when it 
is possible or foreseeable that the UN will sooner or later become a party or 
be considered as a party to the conflict, the Movement should refrain from 
using UN armed escorts.82 
 
IV.4.3.2 Protection of Equipment 
 
                                                          
81  ICRC and International Federation (1995): Report on the Use of Armed Protection for 
Humanitarian Assistance, Council of Delegates, Geneva. 
82  Cf.: Ibid., Para. 4 
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In general the principle of non-use of armed protection also applies to the 
protection of equipment. Then again the resolution determines that a 
possible use of protection in this regard is far less problematic. If the 
security of fixed assets and distribution sites has to be ensured, the local 
authority should be approached in order to receive protection. If the local 
authority is absent or not able to provide sufficient protection, a reputable 
private company should be contracted. It is interesting that the ICRC seems 
to favour the use of a private security company, instead of armed protection 
of equipment by United Nations peacekeeping forces.83 This shows the 
ICRC’s sensitive attitude towards confusing the roles of military and 
humanitarian actors.  
 
The ICRC clearly defines factors that allow the use of armed protection. In 
general any use of it is prohibited. The use of armed protection can only be 
tolerated under precisely defined conditions. Armed escorts pose a greater 
threat to compromise the principles of impartiality and neutrality. 
Consequently the ICRC leaves only a narrow space for the use of it. The 
protection of equipment by armed security is tolerated under less strict 
conditions. However, also these regulations reflect the ICRC’s attitude to 
keep on an operational level, under all circumstances, the greatest possible 
distance from the military, to avoid any misperceptions, regarding its 
relationship with the military, since it could threaten the success of the 
operation and diminish the ICRC’s operational abilities. 
 
IV.4.4 Use of Civil and Military Defence Assets 
 
Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), are defined in the 1994 Oslo 
Guidelines84: 
 
“MCDA comprises relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services 
provided by foreign military and civil defence organizations for 
international humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, civil defence 
organization means any organization that, under the control of a 
Government, performs the functions enumerated in Article 61, paragraph 
(1), of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.” 
 
                                                          
83  Cf.: Ibid., Para. 5. 
84  United Nations (1994): Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets, 
Project DPR 213/3 MCDA, Geneva. 
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The ICRC paper “The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict” 
does not make a very detailed statement on the organisation’s position 
regarding the use of military and civil defence assets. It only concludes that 
the ICRC is wary about it and in the case of using such assets, it should be 
certain that it would not compromise the principles of neutrality and 
impartiality. Furthermore civilian assets should always be preferred.  
 
The “Guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets to support 
UN humanitarian activities in complex emergencies”, which are recently 
formulated by OCHA gives more detailed instructions. Like already 
mentioned in introduction, the ICRC was part of the Review Committee it 
can be assumed that these guidelines also reflect the ICRC’s position. The 
guideline defines the key concepts for the use of MCDAs.85 
 
• Requests for military assets must be based solely on humanitarian 
criteria. 
• MCDA should be requested only as a last resort, if no comparable 
civilian assets are available and if only the use of military assets can 
meet a critical humanitarian need.86 
• Humanitarian operations using military assets must keep its civilian 
nature and character. The operation as a whole remains under the 
authority and control of the humanitarian organisation, while the 
military assets remains under military control. This does not imply that 
the civilian authority exerts command and control status over the 
military assets.87 
• Insofar, as military organizations play a role in supporting 
humanitarian work, such a role should not include direct assistance. A 
clear distinction between the normal functions and roles of 
humanitarian and military actors has to be maintained. 
• The use of MCDA has to be limited in time and scale. It also has to 
have an exit strategy that defines how the military elements will be 
substituted by civilian ones. 
 
It is apparent that the principles for the use of MCDA show a certain 
correlation to the principles for the use of armed protection. The emphasis 
in both cases is also that the use has to be rather the exception rather than 
the rule. Furthermore, if the use is not avoidable in order to alleviate 
                                                          
85  Cf.: Ibid., Para. 27. 
86  Cf. also: Ibid., Para. 7. 
87  Cf. also: Ibid., Para. 6. 
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imminent human suffering, it is stressed that also in these circumstances a 
clear separation of the military from humanitarian actors also has to be 
maintained. Further any intrusion in terms of military control of 
humanitarian action has to be clearly excluded. 
IV.4.5 Training 
 
The ICRC emphasises the need for training to give the military an insight 
into the way humanitarian agencies operate and to increase the awareness 
for problems that derive from differing mandates and cultures. At the same 
time it is important to familiarise the humanitarian community with military 
approaches to complex emergencies. Training also contributes to a higher 
degree of predictability and helps to avoid misunderstandings which arise 
from a lack of information about the role and mission, as well as about the 
operational and conceptual aspects of the work, of the respective other side. 
Due to the ICRC’s special role in promoting International Humanitarian 
Law, the organisation has a long experience and can be expected to have 
good connections to the national military entities. Consequently the ICRC 
plays a major role in alleviating problems that originate from the cultural 
incompatibility of military and humanitarian actors.  
 
The ICRC gives not only courses on International Humanitarian Law, it also 
participate in a growing number of military exercises that deal with civil-
military relations.  
 
IV. 5 Strategies 
 
The Studer paper discusses three possible strategies, between which “the 
ICRC has oscillated in recent years”, to manage civil-military relations. 
These are namely: Isolationism, Proselytism and Ecumenism.88 
 
Isolationism describes an attitude where the ICRC would avoid any contact 
with the military on an operational level by referring to the Movement’s 
Fundamental Principles. This strategy is been viewed as untenable, since the 
ICRC’s mandate and assignment for the promotion for IHL demands to 
establish, to certain degree, relations with the parties involved in a conflict. 
 
The proselytism or conversion strategy describes the attempt to unite all 
humanitarian organisations around the ICRC’s principles, making 
                                                          
88  Studer, Meinrad: The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict, op. cit., p. 384 
et seqq. 
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neutrality, impartiality and independence the foundation of all humanitarian 
action. That would also mean to insist on a strictly neutral form of 
humanitarian action by the UN agencies. This however is virtually 
impossible as the UN, due to its very nature, can never be completely 
apolitical and neutral. The operating units would have to be decoupled from 
the UN political and institutional framework. Even if they were separated, 
the people’s perception would not change, until the UN military operates 
under the same flag as the UN humanitarian agencies. Apart from the UN 
organisations, the application of this strategy could still aim at rallying the 
NGO community under the ICRC’s position. The paper argues that this 
position would be derogatory to the ICRC’s message that NGOs should 
keep their actions separate from political motives. Moreover, every NGO 
has the right to choose its own agenda and mandate. 
 
The Ecumenism strategy constitutes the middle course of the above-
mentioned strategies. This strategy is also seen as the most effective and 
preferable one. The core of this strategy is that the ICRC “declares its 
willingness to cooperate with the military and other humanitarian 
agencies.”89 The ICRC calls for a pragmatic approach. It recognises and 
accepts the fact that other organisations conduct humanitarian action based 
on different motivations and it should exert tolerance when dealing with 
these organisations. The Ecumenism strategy requires a hands-on mentality 
rather than a debate on principles. It determines that when it is a matter of 
saving lives, cooperation with the relevant other organisations should be 
fostered and exerted. Interestingly the ICRC paper even states that it is not 
unthinkable that in a particular situation the military may be in a better 
position to conduct specific humanitarian tasks. However, in these cases the 
ICRC demands that the military role should always be subsidiary in nature. 
The action and relationship should be defined by the word complementarity. 
Action without insight is believed to be aimless; insight without action is 
rejected as pointless. A balance of action and reflection has to be found, and 
one that is not governed by compromise, but by complementarity. 
 
IV.6 Summary 
 
The ICRC opposes any direct involvement of the military in the 
humanitarian sector, since this would or could associate humanitarian 
organisation with political or military objectives that go beyond 
                                                          
89  Ibid., p. 386. 
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humanitarian concerns. However, this does not exclude any cooperation 
between the ICRC and the military. 
 
The ICRC’s policy managing its relationship with the military can be split 
in two elements. On the political level the ICRC seeks and fosters a close 
relationship to the relevant policy and decision makers. The organisation 
tries through active participation to influence the decision making process 
and to promote its view. Cultivating this relationship is not only done when 
the relevant policy makers are deciding about a peacekeeping mission, it 
must be seen as a constant effort. The same attitude applies to the 
relationship at headquarter level in a field operation.  
 
Through the close relationship, the ICRC seeks to accomplish several 
objectives. On the policy level the ICRC promotes its view of humanitarian 
action and tries to exert influence on the planning and integration of the 
humanitarian aspects of a military mission. The goal is to avoid at an early 
stage any ambiguity of the mandates regarding the humanitarian aspects of 
a particular mission. Also the establishment of contacts useful for 
operational cooperation is a primary objective. Secondly, on the operational 
level, the ICRC aspires contacts with the military aiming at the exchange of 
information, primarily regarding the security conditions. Furthermore 
contacts with the military and local authorities are encouraged to make sure 
that IHL is respected. Another important aspect is to clarify and define the 
mandates of the forces regarding its humanitarian elements.  
 
The ICRC’s attitude towards actual cooperation in the field, which is not 
restricted to dialogue, is different. The organisation is particularly 
concerned with keeping a clear separation from the military efforts. 
Consequently any cooperation is basically prohibited. Only in exceptional 
circumstances and according to specific conditions cooperation is possible. 
A decision to cooperate requires always an evaluation of the pros and cons; 
considering the benefit for the people in need and the impact on the 
perception of the ICRC as an impartial and neutral body. Moreover, the 
operation has to keep its civilian character, has to remain under civil 
authority and also maintain its distinction in roles while cooperating with 
the military. Instead of ‘cooperation’ the ICRC favours the term 
‘complementarity’ to describe its relation with the military.  
 
To sum up, the ICRC seeks close consultation at every phase and level in 
order to exert influence on decisions and activities, while maintaining its 
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own independency in decisions and staying clearly distinguishable from the 
military in an actual operation. 
 
 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The redefinition of the international community’s security perception, the 
changed nature of conflicts and the evolution in crisis intervention initiated 
a confounding of the traditional functions of the military and humanitarian 
actors. In particular, problems become apparent when the international 
military forces do not or are not able to restrict their tasks to their core 
competency of security related issues. However, there is a broad consensus 
that the military can effectively contribute to securing peace. It is also 
widely recognised that there is a need to find ways to improve the 
coordination of activities. The major obstacles are based on different 
organisation cultures, different timeframes and a lack in understanding of 
each other’s roles. The potential conditionality of military humanitarian 
assistance is also contrary to humanitarian principles. 
 
The analysis shows that CIMIC can contribute to an enhancement of mutual 
understanding between the military and humanitarian actors. In recent years 
and in particular through NATO’s appearance in the arena of peace support 
operations, the meaning of the term CIMIC changed from a collective term 
that refers to any kind of military-humanitarian interaction, to a term seized 
by the military for its doctrines, describing and defining the relationship 
with non-military actors in a specific mission. In NATO’s understanding, 
CIMIC has clearly a supportive function for the successful accomplishment 
of a military mission. Subsidiary military support, which is not a part of a 
military mandate with military-political objectives, is not a component of 
CIMIC. The withdrawal of other organisations, such as UN-OCHA, from 
using CIMIC, causes a greater recognition of CIMIC as a part of the 
military vocabulary. However, also within the different national and 
supranational militaries, diverse interpretations of CIMIC can be found. A 
further conceptual differentiation is highly desirable. A greater international 
consensus over the meaning of CIMIC would reduce misinterpretations and 
enhance the debate. 
 
When looking at the NATO CIMIC doctrine and the ICRC’s position on 
their relationship with the military, the two organisations seem to agree on 
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many points. NATO is aware of the danger, which a blurring of mandates 
causes. The doctrine emphasises that CIMIC is a commander’s tool to 
ensure efficient management of military interaction with civilian bodies. 
The military goal remains in all circumstances supreme. Like demand by 
the humanitarian actors, the doctrine also determines that the primary 
military objectives are security related tasks. The analysis shows that close 
military-humanitarian consultations at every level are beneficial for the 
conduct of comprehensive missions and for this reason the military as well 
as the ICRC is working on the establishing of relevant contacts. There is 
also a consensus that raising the awareness for the different mandates and 
working cultures is essential for an effective coordination or cooperation. 
 
The ICRC has developed a two-pronged approach for managing its relations 
with the military. It seeks constant and close dialogue with the political and 
military decision-makers and relevant actors in a theatre of operations and 
concurrently maintains a clear separation of ICRC activities in the field 
from the armed forces. The ICRC’s key objectives for management of the 
interface with the military are to avoid ambiguity of military and 
humanitarian mandates through dialogue at an early stage, promotion of 
respect for IHL and the establishment of contacts that are essential for the 
conduct of humanitarian tasks. 
 
Regarding humanitarian action conducted by the military, the NATO 
doctrine states, as a general rule, that the forces primarily focus on the 
establishment of a secure environment. If applicable, consistent with the 
OPLAN and the civil authorities, support for the implementation of civilian 
tasks can be given. They have to be conducted subsidiary to the appropriate 
civilian body. This corresponds with the ICRC’s position, which clearly 
opposes any direct involvement of the military in humanitarian action. Both 
organisations, the ICRC and NATO, also acknowledge exceptional 
circumstances that would justify a take-over of humanitarian tasks by the 
military, which are not conducted subsidiary to a civilian body. The factors 
that would determine such exceptional circumstances are defined very 
similarly by the two organisations. The central argument is that there has to 
be an immediate humanitarian threat, which cannot be met otherwise than 
by military forces.  
 
It is apparent that despite this ostensible consent, the ascertainment of 
exceptional circumstances bears huge potential for disagreement. A 
coherent policy has not yet developed. This is also understandable, govern 
that every mission is different and the situations are not necessarily 
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comparable. The most influential factor is in every case the political will of 
the international community and in particular the interest of states that 
dispatch their military forces on the respective mission, since the military is 
a politically controlled tool of foreign policy. Situations where military 
forces take-over humanitarian tasks for the sake of different objectives, such 
as maintaining international publicity, improving staff moral or as a 
response to the so-called CNN-factor, can be easily imagined.  
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